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ABSTRACT. This paper goes beyond the optimal trading Mean Field Game model intro-
duced by Pierre Cardaliaguet and Charles-Albert Lehalle in [13]. It starts by extending it
to portfolios of correlated instruments. This leads to several original contributions: first
that hedging strategies naturally stem from optimal liquidation schemes on portfolios.
Second we show the influence of trading flows on naive estimates of intraday volatility
and correlations. Focussing on this important relation, we exhibit a closed form formula
expressing standard estimates of correlations as a function of the underlying correlations
and the initial imbalance of large orders, via the optimal flows of our mean field game be-
tween traders. To support our theoretical findings, we use a real dataset of 176 US stocks
from January to December 2014 sampled every 5 minutes to analyze the influence of the
daily flows on the observed correlations. Finally, we propose a toy model based approach
to calibrate our MFG model on data.
1. INTRODUCTION
Optimal liquidation emerged as an academic field with two seminal papers: one [5]
focussed on the balance between trading fast (to minimize the uncertainty of the obtained
price) and trading slow (to minimize the “market impact”, i.e. the detrimental influence of
the trading pressure on price moves) for one representative instrument; while the other
[10] focussed on a portfolio of tradable instruments, shedding light on the interplay with
correlations of price returns and market impact. The last twenty years have seen a lot
of proposals to sophisticate the single instrument case (see these reference books [12,
17, 23] for typical models and references) but very few on extending it to portfolios of
multiple assets (with the notable exception of [25]). Moreover, the usual framework for
optimal execution is the one of one large privileged agent facing a “mean-field” or a
“background noise” made of the sum of behaviours of other market participants, and
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academic literature seldom tackles the strategic interaction of many market participants
seeking to execute large orders.
More recently, game theory has been introduced in this field. First around cases with
few agents, like in [33], and then by [13, 20, 28] relying on Mean Field Games (MFG)
to get rid of the combinatorial complexity of games with few players, considering a lot
of agents, such that their aggregated behaviour reduces to a “anonymous mean field of
liquidity”, shared by all of them.
In this paper, we clearly start within the framework and results obtained by [13] and
extend them to the case of a portfolio of tradable instruments. Our agents are the same
as in this paper: optimal traders seeking to buy and sell positions given at the start of
the day. That for, they rely on the stochastic control problem well defined for one instru-
ment in [17], which result turns to be deterministic because of its linear-quadratic nature:
minimize the cost of the trading under risk-averse conditions and a terminal cost. This
framework can be compared to the one used by [10] in their section on portfolio, with a
diagonal matrix for the market impact, and in a game played by a continuum of agents.
Note that in all these papers, including ours, the time scale is large enough to not take
into account orderbook dynamics, and small enough to be used by traders and deal-
ing desks; our typical terminal time goes from one hour to several days, and time steps
have to be read in minutes. In their paper, Cardaliaguet and Lehalle have shown how
a continuum of such agents with heterogenous preferences can emulate a mix of typical
brokers (having a large risk aversion and terminal cost), and opportunistic traders (with
a low risk aversion). It will be the same for us. But while their paper only addresses
the strategic behavior of investors on a one single financial instrument this one handles
the case of a portfolio of correlated assets. In the real applications, a financial instrument
is rarely traded on its own; most investors construct diversified or hedged portfolios or
index trackers by simultaneously buying and selling a large number of assets.
This has motivated the present work in which we introduce an extension of the initial
Cardaliaguet-Lehalle framework to the case of a multi-asset portfolio. On the one hand,
this extension allows to cover a new type of trading strategies, such as Program Trading
(executing large baskets of stocks), Arbitrage Strategies (which aims to benefit from dis-
crepancies in the dynamics of two or more assets), Hedging Strategies (where a round
trip on a second asset – typically a very liquid one – can be used to partially hedge the
price risk in the execution process of a given asset), and Index Tracking (i.e. following the
composition given by a formula, like in factor investing, or simply following the market
capitalization of a list of instruments). On the other hand, it enables us to understand the
dependence structure between themarket orders flows at “equilibrium”, and assess their
influence on standard estimates of the covariance (or correlation) matrix of asset returns.
These questions were independently raised by some authors and studied in seldom em-
pirical and theoretical works (see e.g. [9, 11, 18, 26, 32] and references therein).
Following the seminal paper [13], we assume that the market impact is either instan-
taneous or permanent, and that the public prices – of all assets – are influenced by the
permanent market impact of all market participants. Conversely, since the agents are af-
fected by the public prices, they aim to anticipate the “market mean field” (i.e. the market
trend due to themarket impact of themean field of all agents) by using all the information
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they have in order to minimize their exposition to the other agents’ impact. As explained
in [13] this leads to a Nash equilibrium configuration of MFG type, in which all agents
anticipate the average trading speed of the population and adjust their execution accord-
ingly. We refer the reader to Section 2 for a more detailed explanation of the Mean Field
Game model. In the context of a MFGwith multi-asset portfolio, the strategic interaction
between the agents during a trading day leads to a non-trivial relationship between the
assets’ order flows, which in turn generates a non-trivial impact on the intraday covari-
ance (or correlation) matrix of asset returns. In Section 3, we provide an exact formula
for the excess covariance matrix of returns that is endogenously generated by the trading
activity, and we show that the magnitude of this effect is more significant when the mar-
ket impact is large. This means for an highly crowded market, illiquid products or large
initial orders (cf. Section 3). These results can be related to the ones of [18], except that in
this paper we do not focus our attention on distressed sells only; we are able to capture
the influence of the usual variations of trading flows to deformations of the naive esti-
mate of the covariance matrix of a portfolio of assets that are simultaneously traded. We
also carry out several numerical simulations and apply our results in an empirical analy-
sis which is conducted on a database of market data from January to December 2014 for
a pool of 176 US stocks. At first, we exhibit the theoretical relation between the intraday
covariance matrix of net traded flows and the standard intraday covariance matrix is in-
creasing, then we use this relation to estimate some parameters of our model, including
the market impact coefficients (cf. Section 3). Next, we normalize the covariance matrix
of returns to compute the intraday median diagonal pattern (across diagonal terms), and
the intraday median off-diagonal pattern (across off-diagonal terms) (cf. Section 3.3), as a
way of characterizing the typical intraday evolution for diagonal and off-diagonal terms.
It allows us to obtain empirically the well-known intraday pattern of volatility that is in
line with our model, and we show that it flattens out as the typical size of transactions
diminishes. In such a case the empirical volatility is close to its “fundamental” value (cf.
Figure 4). Finally, we propose a toy model based approach to calibrate our MFG model
on data.
This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we formulate the problem of optimal
execution of a multi-asset portfolio inside a Mean Field Game. We derive a MFG system
of PDEs and prove uniqueness of solutions to that system for a general Hamiltonian
function. Then we construct a regular solution in the quadratic framework, which will
be considered throughout the rest of the paper. Next, we provide a convenient numerical
scheme to compute the solution of the MFG system, and present several examples of an
agent’s optimal trading path, and the average trading path of the population. Section 3 is
devoted to the analysis of the crowd’s trading impact on the intraday covariance matrix
of returns. At the MFG equilibrium configuration, we derive a formula for the impact
of assets’ order flows on the dependence structure of asset returns. Next, we carry out
numerical simulations to illustrate this fact, and apply our results inan empirical analysis
on a pool of 176 US stocks.
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2. OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO TRADING WITHIN THE CROWD
2.1. The Mean Field Game Model. Consider a continuum of investors (agents), which
are indexed by a parameter a. Each agent has to trade a portfolio corresponding to in-
structions given by a portfolio manager. Think about a continuum of brokers or dealing
desks executing large orders given by their clients. The portfolios are made of desired
positions in a universe of d different stocks (or any financial assets). The initial position
of any agent a is denoted by qa0 := (q
1,a
0 , ...,q
d,a
0 ). For any i, when the initial inven-
tory qi,a0 is positive, it means the agent has to sell this number of shares (or contracts)
whereas when it is negative, the agent has to sell this amount. Given a common horizon
T > 0, we suppose that all the investors have to sell or buy within the trading period
[0, T ]. This means the agent has to sell this number of shares (or contracts) whereas when
it is negative, the agent has to buy this amount.
The intraday position of each investor a is modeled by a Rd-valued process (qat )t∈[0,T ]
which has the following dynamics:
dqat = v
a
t dt, q
a(0) = qa0 .
The investor controls its trading speed (vat )t := (v
1,a
t , ..., v
d,a
t )t through time, in order
to achieve its trading goal. Following the standard optimal liquidation literature, we
assume that, for each stock, the dynamics of the mid-price can be written as:
(2.1) dSit = σi dW
i
t + αiµ
i
t dt, i = 1, ...,d;
where σi > 0 is the arithmetic volatility of the i
th stock, and α1, ...,αd are nonnegative
scalars modeling the magnitude of the permanent market impact. Here (W1t , ...,W
d
t )t>0
are d correlatedWiener processes, and the process (µt)t∈[0,T ] := (µ
1
t, ...,µ
d
t )t corresponds
to the average trading speed of all investors across the portfolio of assets. Throughout,
we shall denote by Σ the covariance matrix of the d-dimensional process (Wt)t∈[0,T ] :=
(σ1W
1
t , ...,σdW
d
t )t∈[0,T ] and suppose that Σ is not singular.
The performance of any investor a is related to the amount of cash generated through-
out the trading process. Given the price vector (St)t∈[0,T ] := (S
1
t, ...,S
d
t )t∈[0,T ], the amount
of cash (Xat )t∈[0,T ] on the account of the trader a is given by:
Xat = −
∫t
0
vas · Ss ds−
d∑
i=1
∫ t
0
ViLi
(
v
i,a
s
Vi
)
ds,
where the positive scalars V1, ...,Vd denotes the magnitude of daily market liquidity (in
practice the average volume traded each day can be used as a proxy for this parameter)
of each asset. Here L1, ...,Ld are the execution cost functions (similar to the ones of [25]),
modelling the instantaneous component of market impact, which takes part in the aver-
age cost of trading. The family of functions Li : R→ R are assumed to fulfil the following
set of assumptions:
• Li(0) = 0;
• Li is strictly convex and nonnegative;
• Li is asymptotically super-linear, i.e. lim|p|→+∞ Li(p)|p| = +∞.
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The initial Cardaliaguet-Lehalle model [13], corresponds to d = 1, and a quadratic
liquidity function of the form L(p) = κ|p|2.
In this paper, we consider a reward function that is similar to [13], and corresponding
to Implementation Shortfall (IS) orders. In this specific case the reward function of any
investor a is given by:
(2.2)
Ua(t, x, s, q;µ) := sup
v
Ex,s,q
(
XaT + q
a
T · (ST −A
aqaT ) −
γa
2
∫T
t
qas · Σq
a
s ds
)
,
where Aa := diag(Aa1 , ...,A
a
d), A
a
i > 0, and γ
a is a non-negative scalar which quantifies
the investor’s risk aversion. That is when γa = 0 the investor is indifferent about holding
inventories through time, while when γa is large the investor attempt to liquidate as fast
as possible. The quadratic term qaT · (ST −A
aqaT ) penalizes non-zero terminal inventories.
One should note that the expression of the reward function (2.2) is derived by considering
that agents are risk-averse with CARA utility function. We omit the details and refer the
reader to [23, Chapter 5].
The Hamilton-Jacobi equation associated to (2.2) is
0 = ∂tU
a −
γa
2
q · Σq+
1
2
Tr
(
ΣD2sU
a
)
+ Aµ · ∇sU
a
+ sup
v
{
v · ∇qU
a −
(
v · s+
d∑
i=1
ViLi
(
vi
Vi
))
∇xU
a
}
,
with the terminal condition
Ua(T , x, s, q;µ) = x+ q · (s−Aaq).
In all this paper we set A := diag(α1, ...,αd). Due to the simplifications that we will
obtain afterwards, we suppose that µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ] is a deterministic process, so that the
HJB equation above is deterministic. When µ is a random process, that is adapted to
the natural filtration of (Wt)t∈[0,T ], we obtain a stochastic backward HJB equation which
requires a specific treatment (cf. [14]).
Following the approach of [13], we consider the following ersatz:
Ua(t, x, s, q;µ) = x+ q · s+ ua(t, q;µ),
which entails the following HJB equation for ua:
(2.3)
γa
2
q · Σq = ∂tu
a + Aµ · q + sup
v
{
v · ∇qu
a −
d∑
i=1
ViLi
(
vi
Vi
)}
,
endowed with the terminal condition:
uaT = −A
aq · q.
For any i = 1, ...,d, let Hi be the Legendre-Fenchel transform of the function Li that is
given by
Hi(p) := sup
ρ
pρ− Li(ρ).
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Since the maps (Li)16i6d are strictly convex, (Hi)16i6d are functions of class C
1, and the
optimal feedback strategies associated to (2.3) are given by
vi,a(t, q) := ViH˙i (∂qiu
a(t, q)) ,
where H˙i denotes the first derivative of Hi. Therefore, the Mean Field Game system
associated to the above problem reads:
(2.4)


γa
2
q · Σq = ∂tu
a + Aµ · q+
d∑
i=1
ViHi (∂qiu
a(t, q))
∂tm+
d∑
i=1
Vi∂qi
(
mH˙i (∂qiu
a(t, q))
)
= 0
µit =
∫
(q,a)
ViH˙i (∂qiu
a(t, q))m(t, dq, da)
m(0, dq, da) = m0(dq, da), u
a
T = −A
aq · q.
The Mean Field Game system (2.4) describes a Nash equilibrium configuration, with in-
finitely many well-informedmarket investors: any individual player anticipates the right
average trading flow on the trading period [0, T ], and computes his optimal strategy ac-
cordingly. Observe that we make a strong assumption by supposing that the considered
group of investors has a precise knowledge of market mean field. In reality this knowl-
edge is only partial or approximate.
Well-posedness for system (2.4) is investigated in [13] within the general framework
ofMean Field Games of Controls. In this work, we provide simpler arguments to deal with
the specific cases of our study. We shall suppose that (Hi)16i6d are of class C
2 and satisfy
the following condition:
(2.5) ∀i = 1, ...,d, ∀p ∈ R, C−10 6 H¨i(p) 6 C0,
for some C0 > 0, and m0 is a probability density with a finite second order moment. More-
over, we suppose that the investors’ index varies in a closed subsetD ⊂ R.
We say that (ua,m)a∈D is a solution to the MFG system (2.4) if the following hold:
• ua ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × R), for a.e a ∈ D, andm in C([0, T ];L1(R×D));
• the equation for ua holds in the classical sens, while the equation for m holds in
the sense of distribution;
• for any t ∈ [0, T ],
(2.6)
∫
R×D
|q|dm(t, dq, da) <∞, and |∇qua(t, q)| 6 C1(1+ |q|),
for some C1 > 0.
Let us start with the following remark on the uniqueness of solutions to (2.4).
Proposition 2.1. Under the above assumptions, system (2.4) has at most one solution.
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Proof. Let (ua1 ,m1)a∈D and (u
a
2 ,m2)a∈D be two solutions to (2.4), and set u¯
a := ua1 −u
a
2 ,
m¯ := m1 −m2. At first, let us assume that m1, m2 are smooth so that the computations
below holds. By using system (2.4), we have:
(2.7)
d
dt
∫
(q,a)
u¯am¯ = −
∫
(q,a)
m¯
{
d∑
i=1
Vi (Hi (∂qiu1) −Hi (∂qiu2)) + A(µ1 − µ2) · q
}
−
∫
(q,a)
u¯
{
d∑
i=1
Vi
(
∂qi
(
m1H˙i (∂qiu1)
)
− ∂qi
(
m2H˙i (∂qiu2)
))}
,
where µ1, µ2 correspond respectively to (u
a
1 ,m1)a∈D and (u
a
2 ,m2)a∈D.
On the one hand, note that∫
(q,a)
m¯A(µ1 − µ2) · q =
1
2
d
dt
AE¯ · E¯, where E¯(t) :=
∫
(q,a)
qdm¯(t).
This follows from
d
dt
E¯ = µ1 − µ2,
which is in turn obtained from system (2.4) after an integration by parts.
On the other hand, by virtue of (2.5) we have
d∑
i=1
Vi
∫ (
m¯ (Hi (∂qiu1) −Hi (∂qiu2)) − ∂qiu¯
(
m1H˙i (∂qiu1) −m2H˙i (∂qiu2)
))
= −
d∑
i=1
Vi
∫ (
m1
(
Hi (∂qiu2) −Hi (∂qiu1) − H˙i (∂qiu1)∂qi(u2 − u1)
))
−
d∑
i=1
Vi
∫ (
m2
(
Hi (∂qiu1) −Hi (∂qiu2) − H˙i (∂qiu2)∂qi(u1 − u2)
))
6 − min
16i6d
Vi
∫
(q,a)
(m1 +m2)
2C0
|∇qu1 −∇qu2|
2
.
Therefore, (2.7) provides
(2.8) min
16i6d
Vi
∫T
0
∫
(q,a)
|∇qu1(s) −∇qu2(s)|
2
d(m1 +m2)ds+
C
2
AE¯(T) · E¯(T) = 0.
By using a standard regularization process, identity (2.8) holds true for any solutions
(ua1 ,m1)a∈D and (u
a
2 ,m2)a∈D of (2.4). Thus, one can use this identity to deduce that
∇qu1 ≡ ∇qu2 on {m1 > 0} ∪ {m2 > 0}, so thatm1,m2 solve the same transport equation:
∂tν+
d∑
i=1
Vi∂qi
(
νH˙i (∂qiu
a
1 (t, q))
)
= 0, νt=0 = m0.
This entailsm1 ≡ m2 and so u1 ≡ u2, by virtue of our regularity assumptions. 
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2.2. Quadratic Liquidity Functions. In practice the liquidity function is often chosen as
strictly convex power function of the form: L(p) = η|p|1+φ +ω|p|, with η,φ,ω > 0. The
additional term ω|p| captures proportional costs such as the bid-ask spread, taxes, fees
paid to brokers, trading venues and custodians[23]. The quadratic case (φ = 1) – that is
also considered in [13] – is particularly interesting because it induces some considerable
simplifications and allows to compute the solutions at a relatively low cost. Throughout
the rest of this paper, we suppose that the liquidity functions take the following simple
form:
(2.9) Li(p) = ηi|p|
2 where ηi > 0, i = 1, ...,d.
Following the approach of [13], we start by setting m¯0(da) :=
∫
q
m0(dq, da). We shall
suppose that
(2.10) m¯0(a) 6= 0, for a.e a ∈ D,
and that investors do not change their preference parametera over time. Thus, we always
have
∫
qm(t, dq, da) = m¯0(da), so that we can disintegratem into
m(t, dq, da) = ma(t, dq)m¯0(da),
where ma(t, dq) is a probability measure in q for m¯0-almost any a. Let us now define
the following process which plays an important role in our analysis:
Ea(t) :=
∫
q
qma(t, dq) ∀t ∈ [0, T ], for a.e a ∈ D,
and we shall denote by Ea,1, ...,Ea,d the components of Ea. By virtue of the PDE satisfied
bym, observe that Ea satisfies the following:
E˙a(t) =
∫
q
q ∂tm
a(t, dq)(2.11)
=
∫
q
(
Vi
2ηi
∂qiu
a(t, q)
)
16i6d
ma(t, dq),
so that
(2.12) µt =
∫
a
E˙a(t)dm¯0(a).
Due to the existence of linear and quadratic terms in the equation satisfied by ua, we
expect the solution to have the following form:
(2.13) ua(t, q) = ha(t) + q
′ ·Ha(t) +
1
2
q ′ ·Ha(t) · q
where ha(t) is R-valued function, Ha(t) := (H
i
a(t))16i6d is R
d-valued function, and
the map Ha(t) := (H
i,j
a (t))16i,j6d take values in the set of R
d×d-symmetric matrices.
Inserting (2.13) in the HJB equation of (2.4) and collecting like terms in q leads to the
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following coupled system of BODEs:
(2.14)


h˙a = −VHa ·Ha
H˙a = −Aµ− 2HaVHa
H˙a = −2HaVHa + γ
aΣ
ha(T) = 0, Ha(T) = 0, Ha(T) = −2A
a,
where V := diag
(
V1
4η1
, ..., Vd
4ηd
)
. In order to solve completely (2.14) we need to know µ,
or the process E˙a thanks to (2.12). Thus, one needs an additional equation to completely
solve the problem.
By virtue of (2.11), we have
(2.15) E˙a = 2VHa + 2VHaE
a.
By combining this equation with system (2.14) one obtains the following FBODE:
(2.16)


E¨a = −2VA
∫
a
E˙a dm¯0(a) + 2γaVΣE
a
Ea(0) = Ea0 :=
∫
q
qm0(q,a)/m¯0(a)
E˙a(T) + 4VAaEa(T) = 0.
This system is a generalized form of the one that is studied in [13], and summarizes the
whole market mean field. Observe that the permanent market impact acts as a friction
term while the market risk terms act as a pushing force toward a faster execution. The
investors heterogeneity is taken into account in the first derivative term, which means
that the contribution of all the market participants to the average trading flow is already
anticipated by all agents.
System (2.16) is our starting point to solve the MFG system (2.4) in the quadratic case.
Due to the forward-backward structure of system (2.16), we need a smallness condition
on A in order to construct a solution. This assumption is also considered in [13], and is
not problematic from a modeling standpoint since |A| is generally small in applications
(cf. Section 3.3). Let us present the construction of solutions to system (2.16).
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that Aa,γa ∈ L
∞(D), then there exists α0 > 0 such that, for |A| 6
α0, the following hold:
(i) there exists a unique process Ea in L1m¯0(D;C
1([0, T ])) which solves system (2.16);
(ii) there exists a constant C2 > 0, such that
(2.17) sup
06w6T
|µw| 6 C2
(
1+
∫
a
|Ea0 |dm¯0
)
eC2T ,
where (µt)t∈[0,T ] is given by (2.12).
Proof. At first, note that the solution Ha to the matrix Riccati equation in (2.14) exists on
[0, T ], is unique, depends only on data, and satisfies (see e.g. [29])
(2.18) − 2Aa − TγaΣ 6 Ha 6 0,
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where the order in the above inequality should be understood in the sense of positive
symmetric matrices. Moreover, note that ΣV and VΣ are both diagonalizable with non-
negative eigenvalues. Thus by using the ODE satisfied by Ha, we know that HaV and
VHa are both diagonalizable with a constant change of basis matrix. In particular, it holds
that
(2.19)
[
Ha(t)V,
∫w
t
Ha(u)V du
]
=
[
VHa(t),
∫w
t
VHa(u)du
]
= 0
for any 0 6 t,w 6 T , where the symbol [B,A] denotes the Lie Bracket: [B,A] = BA−AB.
GivenHa, we aim to construct E˙
a in L1m¯0(D;C([0, T ])) by solving a fixed point relation,
and then deduce Ea. For that purpose, we start by deriving a fixed point relation for E˙a.
By virtue of (2.19), observe that any solution Ea to (2.16) fulfills (2.15) with (see e.g. [31])
Ha(t) =
∫T
t
exp
{∫w
t
2Ha(s)V ds
}
A
∫
a
E˙a(w)dm¯0(a)dw,
so that
Ea(t) = exp
{∫t
0
2VHa(w)dw
}
Ea0
+ 2V
∫ t
0
exp
{∫t
τ
2VHa(w)dw
}∫T
τ
exp
{∫w
τ
2Ha(s)V ds
}
A
∫
a
E˙a(w)dm¯0(a)dw dτ.
By combining this relation with (2.15), we deduce that E˙a satisfies the following fixed
point relation:
(2.20) xa(t) = ΦA(x
a)(t) := 2VHa(t) exp
{∫ t
0
2VHa(w)dw
}
Ea0
+4VHa(t)V
∫ t
0
exp
{∫ t
τ
2VHa(w)dw
}∫T
τ
exp
{∫w
τ
2Ha(s)V ds
}
A
∫
a
xa(w)dm¯0(a)dw dτ
+ 2V
∫T
t
exp
{∫w
t
2Ha(w)V dw
}
A
∫
a
xa(w)dm¯0(a)dw.
Conversely, one checks that if xa is a solution to the fixed point relation (2.20), for a.e.
a ∈ D, then Ea(t) = Ea0 +
∫t
0
xa(s)ds is a solution to system (2.16).
To solve the fixed point relation (2.20), one just uses Banach fixed point Theorem on
ΦA : X→ X, where X := L
1
m¯0
(D;C([0, T ])). It is clear that ΦA is a contraction for |A| small
enough: indeed, given x, y ∈ X, it holds that:
|ΦA(x
a)(t) −ΦA(y
a)(t)| 6 C|A| ‖x− y‖
X
where C > 0 depends only on T , ‖γ‖∞, ‖A‖∞, |V| and |Σ|. Thus, given the solution xa to
(2.20), the function Ea(t) = Ea0 +
∫t
0
xa(s)ds solves (2.16), and belongs to L1m¯0(D;C([0, T ]))
given that m0 have a finite first order moment. Estimate (2.17) ensues from Gro¨nwall’s
Lemma. 
We are now in position to solve the MFG system (2.4) in the case of quadratic liquidity
functions (2.9).
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Theorem 2.3. Under (2.9), (2.10), and assumptions of Proposition 2.2, the Mean Field Game
system (2.4) has a unique solution.
Proof. Since (2.16) is solvable thanks to Proposition 2.2, we can now solve completely
system (2.14) and deduce ua(t, q;µ) thanks to (2.13). In fact, owing to (2.19) we know
that (cf. [31]): 

Ha(t) =
∫T
t
exp
{∫w
t
2Ha(s)V ds
}
Aµw dw
ha(t) =
∫T
t
VHa(w) ·Ha(w)dw,
so that the function ua(t, q;µ), that is given by (2.13), is C1,2([0, T ] × R). Furthermore, by
virtue of (2.17)-(2.18), note that
(2.21) |∇qu
a(t, q)| 6 C(1+ |q|)
for some constant C > 0which depends only on T and data.
Now, as ua is regular and satisfies (2.21), we know that the transport equation
∂tm
a +
d∑
i=1
Vi∂qi (m
a∂qiu
a(t, q)) = 0, ma(0, dq) = m0(dq, da)/m¯0(a)
has a unique weak solution ma ∈ C([0, T ];L1(R)) for a.e a ∈ D, so that m := mam¯0
solves, in the weak sense, the following Cauchy problem:
∂tm +
d∑
i=1
Vi∂qi (m∂qiu
a(t, q)) = 0, m(0, dq, da) = m0(dq, da).
In addition, one easily checks thatm belongs to C([0, T ];L1(R×D)).
By invoking the uniqueness of solutions to (2.16), we have
Ea(t) =
∫
q
qma(t,q)dq for a.e a ∈ D.
Thus through the same computations as in (2.11) we obtain
µit =
∫
(q,a)
Vi∂qiu
a(t, q)ma(t, q)m¯0(a)dadq, i = 1, ...,d,
so that (ua,m)a∈D solves the MFG system (2.4).
By virtue of Proposition 2.1, any constructed solution is unique. So to conclude the
proof, it remains to show that:∫
R×D
|q|m(t, q,a)dqda <∞.
For that purpose, let us set Ψ(t) :=
∫
R×D |q|
2m(t, q,a)dqda. After differentiating Ψ and
integrating by parts, we obtain the following ODE that is satisfied by Ψ:
Ψ(t) = Ψ(0) + 2
∫ t
0
∫
a
Ha(w) · E
a(w)m¯0(da)dw + 2
∫ t
0
∫
a
(Ha(w)q · q)m(t, dq, da)dw,
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so that
|Ψ(t)| 6 |Ψ(0)| + C
{
sup
06w6T
‖Ea(w)‖L1m¯0
+
∫ t
0
|Ψ(w)|dw
}
holds thanks to (2.17)-(2.18). Hence, asm0 has a finite second order moment, we deduce
from Gro¨nwall’s Lemma that for any t ∈ [0, T ]∫
R×D
|q|2m(t, q,a)dqda <∞,
which in turn entails the desired result. 
2.3. Stylized Facts & Numerical Simulations. Let us now comment our results and
highlight several stylized facts of the system. By virtue of (2.13), the optimal trading
speed v∗a is given by:
v∗a(t, q) = 2VHa(t)q + 2VHa(t)(2.22)
= 2VHa(t)q + 2V
∫T
t
exp
{∫w
t
2Ha(s)V ds
}
Aµw dw
=: v1,∗a (t, q) + v
2,∗
a (t;µ).
The above expression shows that the optimal trading speed is divided into two distinct
parts v1,∗a , v
2,∗
a . The first part v
1,∗
a corresponds to the classical Almgren-Chriss solution in
the case of a complexe portfolio (cf. [23]). The second part v2,∗a adjusts the speed based
on the anticipated future average trading on the remainder of the trading window [t, T ].
Since the matrix Ha is negative, note that the strategy gives more weight to the current
expected average trading. Moreover, the contribution of the corrective term decreases as
we approach the end of the trading horizon. The correction term aims to take advantage
of the anticipated market mean field.
Let us set
(2.23) Ga(t,w) := exp
{∫w
t
2Ha(s)V ds
}
A.
Note that the matrixGa is not necessarily symmetric and could have a different structure
than Ha. In view of the market price dynamics, the trading speed expression shows that
an action of an individual investor or trader on asset i could have a direct impact on the
price of asset j, at least when the two assets are fundamentally correlated, i.e. Σi,j 6= 0.
This phenomenonof cross impact is related to the fact that other traders already anticipates
the market mean field and aim to take advantage from that information, especially when
asset j is more liquid than asset i (or vice versa). Thus, if an investor is trading as the
crowd is expecting her to trade, then she is more likely to get a “cross-impact” through the
action of the other traders. This fact is empirically addressed in [9, 26].
Another expression of the optimal trading speed can also be derived thanks to (2.15).
In fact, we have that:
(2.24) v∗a(t,q) = E˙
a + 2VHa(t)(q − E
a).
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The above formulation shows that an individual investor should follow the market mean
field but with a correction term which depends on the situation of her inventory relative
to the population average inventory.
In order to simplify the presentation, we ignore from now on investors heterogeneity
and assume that market participants have identical preferences. Under this assumption,
system (2.16) simply reads:
(2.25)
{
E¨ = −2VAE˙+ 2γVΣE
E(0) = E0, E˙(T) + 4VAE(T) = 0.
Given a discretization step δt = N−1, the solution of (2.25) is approached by a sequence
(xk,yk)06k6N according to the following implicit scheme:

x0 = E0
xk − xk−1 − δtyk−1 = 0, k = 1, ...,N
yk − yk−1 − δt (2γVΣxk − 2VAyk) = 0, k = 1, ...,N
4VAxN + yN = 0.
Hence, computing an approximate solution to system (2.25) reduces to solving a straight-
forward linear system. One checks that under conditions of Proposition 2.2, the above
numerical scheme converges and is stable.
Now, we can present some examples by using the above numerical method. We con-
sider a portfolio containing three assets (Asset 1, Asset 2, Asset 3) with the following
characteristics:
• σ1 = σ3 = 0.3 $.day
−1/2.share−1, σ2 = 1 $.day
−1/2.share−1;
• V1 = 2, 000, 000 share.day
−1, V2 = V3 = 5, 000, 000 share.day
−1;
• η1 = η2 = 0.1 $.share
−1, η3 = 0.4 $.share
−1, A1 = A2 = 2.5 $.day
−1
.share−1;
• α1 = α2 = 8× 10
−4 $.share−1, α3 = 6× 10
−4 $.share−1.
In Figure 1(a)-1(d), we consider a market with the initial average inventories E10 =
100, 000, E20 = 50, 000, and E
3
0 = −25, 000 shares, for Asset 1, Asset 2, and Asset 3 respec-
tively. In this example, we suppose that the correlation between the price increments of
Asset 1 and Asset 2 is 80 %, and we set γ = 5× 10−5 $−1 except for Figure 1(c).
Figure 1(a) shows that changing the permanent market impact prefactors (αk)16k63
has a significant influence on the average execution speed. This fact was pointed out in
[13], and is essentially related to the fact that the higher the permanent market impact
parameter the more the anticipated influence of the other market participants become
important. Namely, when αk is large, traders anticipate a more significant pressure on
the price of Asset k, and adjust their trading speed. On the other hand, dynamics of Asset
2 shows that the higher the market liquidity the faster is the execution. This is expected
since the more liquid the faster assets are traded. Finally, dynamics of Asset 3 shows that
traders accelerate their execution on volatile asset. It corresponds to a natural reaction
due to risk aversion; a trader will try to reduce his exposure to the more risky (hence
volatile) assets in priority.
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(b) Optimal trading of an individual investor with:
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(d) Optimal trading of an individual investor with:
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FIGURE 1. Simulated examples of the dynamics of E and optimal trading
curves of an individual investor. The dashed lines in Figure 1(a) corre-
spond to: α1 = 6 × 10
−4 $.share−1, V2 = 7, 000, 000 share.day
−1, and
σ3 = 5 $.day
−1/2.share−1.
Figure 1(c) illustrates the behavior of the crowd of investors with an increasing risk
aversion (higher γ). In the two presented scenarios, one can observe that Asset 2 is liqui-
dated very quickly, then a short position is built (around t = 0.05 for γ = 5 × 10−2 $−1)
and it is finally progressively unwound. This exhibits the emergence of a Hedging Strat-
egy: indeed, since Asset 1 and Asset 2 are highly correlated, investors can slow down
the execution process for the less liquid asset (Asset 1) to reduce the transaction costs, by
using the more liquid asset (Asset 2) to hedge the market risk associated to Asset 1. The
trader has an incentive to use such a strategy as soon as the cost of the roundtrip in Asset
2 is smaller than the corresponding reduction of the risk exposure (seen from its reward
function Ua(t, x, s, q;µ) defined by equality (2.2)).
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Now, we provide examples of individual players’ optimal strategies. We consider two
examples: an individual investor with initial inventory q10 = 40, 000, q
2
0 = 0, and q
3
0 =
110, 000 in Figure 1(b); and an individual investor with initial inventory q10 = 100, 000,
and q20 = q
3
0 = 0 in Figure 1(d).
In Figure 1(d) the considered investor starts from q10 = E
1
0. Hence, by virtue of (2.24)
her liquidation curve follows exactly the market mean field. Moreover, the investor takes
advantage of the anticipated evolution of the market by building favorable positions on
Asset 2 and Asset 3: building a short (resp. a long) position onAsset 2 (resp. Asset 3), and
buying (resp. selling) back in order to take advantage of price drop (resp. raise) induced
by the massive liquidation (resp. purchase). The trading strategies on Asset 2 and Asset
3 are related to the term v2,∗ in (2.22). This strategy can be described as a “Liquidity
Arbitrage Strategy”.
Figure 1(b) shows two interesting facts: on the one hand, the individual player builds
a short position on Asset 1 after achieving her goal (complete liquidation) in order to take
advantage of the market selling pressure; on the other hand, by taking into account the
market buying pressure on Asset 1, the investor slows down her liquidation to reduce
execution costs since she anticipates no sustainable price decline.
3. THE DEPENDENCE STRUCTURE OF ASSET RETURNS
The main purpose of this section is to analyze the impact of large transactions on the
observed covariance matrix between asset returns, by using the Mean Field Game frame-
work of Section 2. For that purpose, we assume a simple model where a continuum of
players trade a portfolio of assets on each day, and where the initial distribution of in-
ventories across the investors m0 changes randomly from one day to another according
to some given law of probability. We assume that the price dynamics is given by (2.1),
and we consider the problem of estimating the covariance matrix of asset returns given
a large dataset of intraday observations of the price. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore
investors heterogeneity and assume that market participants have identical preferences.
Next, we compare our findings with an empirical analysis on a pool of 176 US stocks
sampled every 5 minutes over year 2014 and calibrate our model to market data.
Throughout this section, we denote by
〈
X2
〉
the variance ofX, and 〈X,Y〉 the covariance
between X and Y, for any two random variables X,Y. Moreover, we will call a “bin” a
slice of 5 minutes. We focused on continuous trading hours because the mechanism of
call auctions (i.e. opening and closing auctions is specific). Since US markets open from
9h30 to 16h, our database has 78 bins per day. They will be numbered from 1 toM and
indexed by k.
3.1. Estimation using Intraday Data. We suppose that E0 is a random variable with a
given realization on each trading period [0, T ], where T = 1 day (trading day); and we
consider the problem of estimating the covariance matrix of asset returns given the fol-
lowing observations of the price:{(
Snt1,1 , ...,S
n
t1,M
)
,
(
Snt2,1 , ...,S
n
t2,M
)
, ....,
(
SntN,1 , ...,S
n
tN,M
)}
, n = 1, ...,d
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where Sntℓ,k is the price of asset n in bin k of day ℓ. We suppose that tℓ,1 = 0, tℓ,M = T , for
any 1 6 ℓ 6 N, and tℓ,k = tℓ ′,k = tk for any 1 6 k 6M, 1 6 ℓ, ℓ
′ 6 N.
For simplicity, we suppose that the covariance matrix of asset returns between tk and
tk+1 is estimated form data by using the following “naive” estimator :
(3.1) Ci,j
[tk,tk+1]
:=
1
N− 1
N∑
l=1
(
δSi,k,l − δS
i,k
)(
δSj,k,l − δS
j,k
)
,
where δSn,k,l = Sntl,k+1 − S
n
tl,k
and δS
n,k
= N−1
∑N
l=1 δS
n,k,l, n = i, j. We define the
correlation matrix as follows:
(3.2) Ri,j
[tk,tk+1]
:=
C
i,j
[tk,tk+1](
C
i,i
[tk,tk+1]
C
j,j
[tk,tk+1]
)1/2 .
Suppose that the price dynamics is given by (2.1), then the following proposition pro-
vides an exact computation of Ci,j
[tk,tk+1]
.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that E0 is independent from the process (Wt)t∈[0,T ], then for any
1 6 k 6M− 1 and 1 6 i, j 6 d, the following hold:
(3.3) Ci,j
[tk,tk+1]
= (tk+1 − tk)Σi,j + αiαj
ηiηj
4ViVj
Λ
i,j
k + ǫN,
where ǫN → 0 as N→∞,
Λ
i,j
k :=
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
θ
i,ℓ
k ,θ
j,ℓ ′
k
〉
+
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
π
i,ℓ
k ,θ
j,ℓ ′
k
〉
+
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
θ
i,ℓ
k ,π
j,ℓ ′
k
〉
+
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
π
i,ℓ
k ,π
j,ℓ ′
k
〉
,
and
π
n,ℓ
k :=
∫tk+1
tk
H
n,ℓ(s)Eℓ(s)ds, θ
n,ℓ
k :=
∫ tk+1
tk
∫T
s
G
n,ℓ(s,w)µℓ(w)dw ds.
Proof. Use the exact expression of the price dynamics (2.1), the law of large numbers, and
the independence between E0 and (Wt)t∈[0,T ] to obtain:
(3.4) Ci,j
[tk,tk+1]
= ǫN + (tk+1 − tk)Σi,j
+ αiαj
1
(N− 1)
N∑
l=1
∫ tk+1
tk
(
µi,ls − µ¯
i
s
)
ds
∫tk+1
tk
(
µ
j,l
s ′ − µ¯
j
s ′
)
ds′,
where µ¯nu = N
−1
∑N
l=1 µ
n,l
u , and µ
l,El are respectively the realizations of µ,E in day l.
Now, owing to (2.22)-(2.23), we know that
µ
l
t = 2VH(t)E
l(t) + 2V
∫T
t
G(t,w)µlw dw =: ν
1,l(t) + ν2,l(t).
Thus by setting
ν˜
n,l
k :=
∫tk+1
tk
(
ν
n,l(s) −N−1
N∑
l=1
ν
n,l(s)
)
ds, n = 1, 2,
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we deduce that∫ tk+1
tk
(
µi,ℓs − µ¯
i
s
)
ds
∫tk+1
tk
(
µ
j,ℓ
s ′ − µ¯
j
s ′
)
ds′ =
(
ν˜
1,l,i
k + ν˜
2,l,i
k
)(
ν˜
1,l,j
k + ν˜
2,l,j
k
)
.
The desired result ensues by noting the existence of estimation noises ǫ1N,ǫ
2
N,ǫ
3
N and ǫ
4
N,
such that:
(N− 1)−1
N∑
l=1
ν˜
1,l,i
k ν˜
1,l,j
k =
ηiηj
4ViVj
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
π
i,ℓ
k ,π
j,ℓ ′
k
〉
+ ǫ1N;
(N− 1)−1
N∑
l=1
ν˜
2,l,i
k ν˜
2,l,j
k =
ηiηj
4ViVj
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
θ
i,ℓ
k ,θ
j,ℓ ′
k
〉
+ ǫ2N;
(N− 1)−1
N∑
l=1
ν˜
1,l,i
k ν˜
2,l,j
k =
ηiηj
4ViVj
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
π
i,ℓ
k ,θ
j,ℓ ′
k
〉
+ ǫ3N;
(N− 1)−1
N∑
l=1
ν˜
1,l,j
k ν˜
2,l,i
k =
ηiηj
4ViVj
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
θ
i,ℓ
k ,π
j,ℓ ′
k
〉
+ ǫ4N.
The proof is complete. 
Remark 3.2. One can easily derive an analogous result for
(
C
i,j
[0,T ]
)
16i,j6d
. Namely, it
holds that:
(3.5) Ci,j
[0,T ]
= TΣi,j + αiαj
ηiηj
4ViVj
Λi,j + ǫN,
where ǫN → 0 as N→∞,
Λi,j :=
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
θi,ℓ,θj,ℓ
′
〉
+
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
πi,ℓ,θj,ℓ
′
〉
+
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
θi,ℓ,πj,ℓ
′
〉
,+
∑
16ℓ,ℓ ′6d
〈
πi,ℓ,πj,ℓ
′
〉
,
and
πn,ℓ :=
∫T
0
H
n,ℓ(s)Eℓ(s)ds, θn,ℓ :=
∫T
0
∫T
s
G
n,ℓ(s,w)µℓ(w)dw ds.
Identities (3.3) and (3.5) show that the realized covariance matrix is the sum of the
fundamental covariance and an excess realized covariance matrix generated by the impact
of the crowd of institutional investors’ trading strategies. Note on the one hand that the
diagonal terms Ci,i are always deviated from fundamentals because of the contribution
of
〈
(πi,i)2
〉
and
〈
(θi,i)2
〉
. On the other hand, since H and G inherit a structure similar to
Σ, the excess of realized covariance in the off-diagonal terms is non-zero as soon as one –
or both – of the conditions below is satisfied:
• there exists i0 6= j0 such that Σi0,j0 6= 0;
• there exists i0 6= j0 such that
〈
Ei00 ,E
j0
0
〉
6= 0.
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Moreover, (3.3) and (3.5) show that the excess realized covariance can deviate signifi-
cantly from fundamentals when: the market impact is large (high crowdedness), the considered
assets are highly liquid (small ηi/Vi), the risk aversion coefficient γ is high, or when the standard
deviation of E0 is large. In addition, since the contribution of θ
n,ℓ
k and π
n,ℓ
k vanishes as we
approach the end of the trading horizon, observe that
(3.6) Ci,j
[tk,tk+1]
∼ (tk+1 − tk)Σi,j, as tk+1 → T ,
whichmeans that one converges tomarket fundamentals at the end of the trading period.
This is due to the fact that, in our model, all traders have high enough risk aversions so
that their trading speeds go to zero close to the terminal time T .
By virtue of (3.3), one can also explain the realized correlation matrix in terms of the
fundamental correlations ρi,j := Σi,j/(Σi,iΣj,j)
1/2. Namely, it holds that:
(3.7)
R
i,j
[tk,tk+1]
= ρi,j
(tk+1 − tk)2Σi,iΣj,j
C
i,i
[tk,tk+1]
C
j,j
[tk,tk+1]
1/2 + αiαjηiηjΛi,jk
4ViVj
(
C
i,i
[tk,tk+1]
C
j,j
[tk,tk+1]
)1/2 + ǫN
=: ρi,jA
i,j
k + B
i,j
k + ǫN
for any 1 6 i < j 6 d. This expression shows that the deviation of the realized correlation
from fundamentals is a linear map. The numerator of the multiplicative part Ai,jk does
not depend on the off-diagonal terms of Hwhile it is the case for the additive part Bi,jk .
3.2. Numerical Simulations. In this part, we conduct several numerical experiments in
order to illustrate the impact of trading on the structure of the covariance matrix of asset
returns.
We consider the example of Section 2.3 by choosing ρ1,2 = 60%, ρ1,3 = 30% and ρ2,3 =
5%. For simplicity, we suppose that E0 is a centered Gaussian random vector with a
covariance matrix Γ that is given by:
Γ := λ2.
 1 0.2 −0.10.2 1 0.3
−0.1 0.3 1
 ,
where λ = 10, 000 share. We fix a time step δt = 10−2 day (∼ 4min), set tk+1 − tk = δt,
and estimate
(
C
i,j
[tk,tk+δt]
)
16i6j63
16k6M−1
and
(
R
i,j
[tk,tk+δt]
)
16i<j63
16k6M−1
by generating a sample
of N = 10, 000 observations using the numerical method of Section 2.3.
Figures 2(a)-2(d) show that the observed covariance and correlation matrices are sig-
nificantly deviated from fundamentals and especially at the beginning of the trading day.
Figures 2(b)-2(d) also illustrates the sensitivity of the deviation relative to the change of
the standard deviation of initial inventories: as λ diminishes, the impact of trading is
lower and the covariance and correlation matrices converge toward fundamentals.
On the other hand, we observe that the beginning of the trading period is dominated
by the dependence structure of initial inventories. This is due to the domination of the
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FIGURE 2. Simulated examples of intraday covariance and correlation
matrices using (2.1).
additive terms (Bi,jk )16i<j63; in fact, given the relative high magnitude of denominator
terms, (Ai,jk )16i<j63 are very small when tk → 0. Furthermore, we note that all the ob-
served quantities converge toward fundamentals at the end of the trading period, which
is in line with (3.6).
3.3. Empirical Application. Now, we carry out an empirical analysis on a pool of d =
176 stocks. The data consists of five-minute binned trades (δt = 5min) and quotes infor-
mation from January 2014 to December 2014, extracted from the primary market of each
stock (NYSE or NASDAQ). We only focus on the beginning of the continuous trading session
removing 30 min after the open and the last 90 min before the close, in order to avoid the partic-
ularities of trading activity in these periods and target close strategies. Thus, the number
of days is N = 252 and the number of bins per day is M = 55. Days will be labelled by
l = 1, ...,N, bins by k = 1, ...,M, and for simplicity we note Ci,jk instead of C
i,j
[tk−δt,tk]
for
any 1 6 i, j 6 d.
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Our goal is to empirically assess the the influence of trading activity on the intraday
covariance matrix of asset returns, and then compare the obtained models with our pre-
vious theoretical observations. Given our analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we expect an
excess in the observed covariance matrix of asset returns and especially at the beginning
of the trading period. Moreover, we expect the magnitude of this effect to be an increas-
ing function of the typical size of market orders as it is noticed in Figures 2(b) and 2(d).
3.3.1. Market Impact. Let us start by assessing the relationship between the intraday vari-
ance of asset returns and the intraday variance of net exchanged flows (Fi,ik )16i6d, that
is defined by:
F
i,i
k :=
1
N− 1
N∑
l=1
(
νik,l − ν¯
i
k
) (
νik,l − ν¯
i
k
)
for any 1 6 i 6 d and k = 1, ...,M; where νik,l is the net sum of exchanged volumes
between tk−δt and tk for stock i in day l, and ν¯
i
k = N
−1
∑N
l=1 ν
i
k,l (i.e. ν¯
i
k is an estimate
of the expectation of νik,l regardless of the day). As a by-product, we obtain estimates
for the permanent market impact factors. Though ν does not represent exactly the same
quantity as the variable µ of Section 3.1, both variables are an indicator of market order
flows and for simplicity we shall use ν as a proxy for µ.
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FIGURE 3. Dependence structure between (Ci,ik )16k6M and (F
i,i
k )16k6M.
Figure 3(a) displays the relationship between (Ci,ik )16k6M and
(F
i,i
k )16k6M for GOOG. Figure 3(b) exhibits the histogram of corre-
lations denoted Corr (C, F).
Figure 3(a) shows a strong positive correlation between (Ci,ik )16k6M and (F
i,i
k )16k6M
for GOOG. Figure 3(b) shows that this is true for almost all the stocks and reinforces
our findings in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Furthermore, as (3.4) suggests, we suppose a linear
relationship between (Ci,ik )16k6M and (F
i,i
k )16k6M; thus for every 1 6 i 6 d we fit the
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following regression:
(3.8) Ci,i = ǫ+ δt · Σ+ α2 · Fi,i
where ǫ is the error term (assumed normal), the coefficient Σ is related to the “funda-
mental” covariance matrix of asset returns and the square root of the coefficient α2 is
homogeneous to the market impact factor (cf. (3.4)). In Table 1 we show estimates of
α, Σ and the correlation between (Ci,ik )16k6M and (F
i,i
k )16k6M (denoted Corr (C, F)) for
several examples. In particular, we obtain estimates for the permanent market impact α̂.
AAPL BMRN GOOG INTC
α̂ (bp) 0.8 8.43 2.5 0.01
α̂2 6.41 × 10−11 7.11 × 10−9 6.25 × 10−8 1.79 × 10−12
std. (4.15 × 10−12) (3.98 × 10−10) (3.17 × 10−9) (1.58 × 10−13)
p-value 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Σ̂ 0.16 −0.01 0.15 5.5 × 10−3
std. (0.05) (0.05) (0.49) (2× 10−4)
p-value 0.01% 60% 75% 2%
Corr (C, F) 90% 92% 94% 84%
TABLE 1. Estimates for α, Σ and the realized correlation between
(C
i,i
k )16k6M and (F
i,i
k )16k6M for Nasdaq stocks. For each estimate the
standard deviation (std.) is shown in parentheses and the p-value is given
in the third row. Numbers in bold are significant at a level of at least 99%.
3.3.2. The Typical Intraday Pattern. Next, we are interested in the intraday evolution of
the diagonal and off-diagonal terms of the covariance matrix of returns, and in the way
this evolution is affected when the typical size of trades diminishes. For that purpose, we
compute the intraday covariance matrix of returns for our pool of US stocks and we nor-
malize each term (Ci,jk )16k6M by its daily average, then we consider the median value of
diagonal terms and off-diagonal terms as a way of characterizing the evolution of a typi-
cal diagonal term and a typical off-diagonal term respectively. The impact of the relative
size of orders on the intraday patterns is assessed by conditioning our estimations.
More exactly, we start by defining the matrix of trade imbalances for each stock n in
order to be able to compare the relative size of trades. Namely, for any n,k, l, we set:
wnk,l :=
νnk,l
mean
16l6N
∑
k |ν
n
k,l|
,
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wheremeann∈A{xn} denotes the average of (xn) as n varies in A. This mean is an esti-
mate of the expectation of the sum of the absolute values of νnk,l over a day; it can be seen
as a renormalizing constant, enabling us to mix different stocks on Figure 4.
Next, we define the conditioned intraday covariance matrix
(
C
i,j
k (λ)
)
16i,j6d
16k6M
for every
λ > 0 as follows:
(3.9) Ci,jk (λ) :=
1
#E
i,j
k (λ) − 1
∑
l∈E
i,j
k (λ)
(
δSi,k,l − δS
i,j,k
λ
)(
δSj,k,l − δS
j,i,k
λ
)
,
where:
• the set Ei,jk (λ) corresponds to a conditioning: it contains only days for which this
5 min bins (indexed by k) for this pair of stocks (indexed by (i, j), note that we
can have i = j) is such that the renormalized net volumes are (in absolute value)
below λ. It is strictly defined as follows:
E
i,j
k (λ) :=
{
1 6 l 6 N : |wik,l| 6 λ and |w
j
k,l| 6 λ
}
;
• δSn,k,l is the price increment defined as for (3.1) and is computed from the historic
stock prices;
• δS
i,j,k
λ is the average price increment over selected days, given by: δS
i,j,k
λ =(∑
l∈E
i,j
k (λ)
δSi,k,l
)
/
(
#E
i,j
k (λ)
)
;
• #Ei,jk (λ) denotes the number of elements of E
i,j
k (λ): the number of selected days.
Note that the stricter the conditioning (i.e. the smaller λ), the less days in the
selection, and hence the smaller #Ei,jk (λ).
Here
(
C
i,j
k (λ)
)
16i,j6d
16k6M
represents the intraday covariance matrix of returns conditioned
on trade imbalances between −λ and λ. In all our examples, the coefficient λ is chosen
to have enough days in the selection (for obvious statistical significance reasons), i.e. so
that#Ei,jk (λ)≫ 1 for any 1 6 i, j 6 d and 1 6 k 6M.
Now we define the median diagonal pattern Cdiag(λ) :=
(
C
diag
k (λ)
)
16k6M
and the
median off-diagonal pattern Coff(λ) :=
(
Coffk (λ)
)
16k6M
as follows:
C
diag
k (λ) :=median
16i6d
{
C
i,i
k (λ)/ mean
16k6M
{
C
i,i
k (1)
}}
and
Coffk (λ) := median
16i<j6d
{
C
i,j
k (λ)/ mean
16k6M
{
C
i,j
k (1)
}}
,
for any k = 1, ...,M and λ > 0. Here the notation mediann∈A{xn} denotes the median
value of (xn) as n varies in A. One should note that the choice of the normalization con-
stant (i.e. the mean over bins ofCi,jk (1)) will allow us to compare the different curves with
respect to the reference case, i.e. without conditioning. In fact, it turns out that λ = 1 re-
moves all conditionings: 1 is above themaximum value of our renormalized flows. More-
over, we set#Ediagk (λ) := median
16i6d
{
#E
i,i
k (λ)
}
and #Eoffk (λ) :=median
16i<j6d
{
#E
i,j
k (λ)
}
.
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FIGURE 4. Plots of the median diagonal pattern Cdiag(λ) and the median
off-diagonal pattern Coff(λ) for diverse values of λ. The secondary axis
corresponds to the number of observations for each 5 minutes bin after
the conditioning.
We take medians instead of means to have robust estimates of the expectations. We do
not want our estimates to be polluted by few days of potential erratic market data, that
could for instance be due to trading interruptions.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) displays representations of Cdiag(λ) and Coff(λ) for various val-
ues of λ. Observe that Cdiag(1) and Coff(1) exhibits a pattern that is very similar to our
simulation in Figures 2(b) and 2(d), especially between the beginning of the trading pe-
riod and 13 : 00. Indeed, the observed quantities are high at the beginning of the trading
period, lower as the day progresses until it reaches a minimum around 13 : 00, followed
by a slight increase until market close. The general shape of these curves (left-slanted
smile) is well-known (see e.g. [17] and references therein).
Our core observation is that: given the absolute value of the net flows are small, this average
curve flattens out, even at the beginning of the day. At our knowledge, it is the first time that
this conditioning is mentioned, and it is perfectly in line with our simulated Figures 2(b)
and 2(d). This suggests the slopes of the “averaged volatility curves” comes essentially
from the days duringwhich there is a large positive or negative imbalance of large orders,
that are “optimally” executed. We believe that this analysis should be completed by
using a larger data set.
3.3.3. A Toy Model Calibration. Now, we use historical data to fit our MFGmodel to some
examples of traded stocks. For that purpose, we use a very simple approach by reducing
as much as possible the number of parameters:
(S1) We suppose that E0 is a centered Gaussian random vector with a covariance ma-
trix Γ . Moreover, as suggested by (2.12) , we use Corr
(∑
k ν
i
k,
∑
k ν
j
k
)
as a proxy
for Corr
(
Ei0,E
j
0
)
, and which is in turn estimated from data by using the standard
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estimator :
1
N− 1
N∑
l=1
(∑
k
νik,l −
∑
k
νik,l
)(∑
k
ν
j
k,l −
∑
k
ν
j
k,l
)
,
where
∑
k ν
i
k,l = N
−1
∑
l
∑
k ν
i
k,l.
(S2) As suggested by Figures 4(a)-4(b) we choose
δtΣi,j = 0.2× mean
16k6M
{
C
i,j
k (1)
}
,
and we shift upward the simulated curves by δ = 0.3× mean
16k6M
{
C
i,j
k (1)
}
;
(S3) Finally, we fix the penalization parameters Ai = A = 10, and choose ki := Vi/ηi,
γ, and Γi,i by minimizing the L
2-error between the simulated curves and real
curves.
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FIGURE 5. Comparison between the simulated curves and the real curves
for two examples. Figure 5(a) corresponds to i ≡ j ≡ GOOG and Figure
5(b) corresponds to (i, j) ≡ (GOOG,AAPL).
Figures 5(a)-5(b) show illustrative examples by considering the two-stocks portfolio:
Asset 1 ≡ GOOG; Asset 2 ≡ AAPL. For that example, the parameters of our model are
presented in Table 2.
Here Γ1,2, α1, α2, σ1, σ2, ρ1,2 are estimated from data (cf. Table 1 and Figures 4(a)-4(b)),
while Γ1,1, Γ2,2, γ, k1, k2 are computed by minimizing the L
2-error between the simulated
curves and real curves. Following this approach, one requires 2d + 1 parameters to fit a
portfolio of d stocks (i.e. d(d + 1)/2 curves).
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Estimated using the regression (3.8) of Section 3.3 and (S1)-(S2)
Corr
(
E10,E
2
0
)
= 20% , α1 = 2.5 × 10
−4, σ1 = 1.55,
ρ1,2 = 0.5%, α2 = 7.9 × 10
−5, σ2 = 0.43,
Calibrated on curves of Figure 5(a) and 5(b)
Γ1,1 = 3.6× 10
9, Γ2,2 = 2.02 × 10
9, γ = 10−3,
k1 = 2× 10
7, k2 = 8× 10
8.
TABLE 2. The MFG model parameters for the two-stocks portfolio: Asset
1 ≡ GOOG; Asset 2 ≡ AAPL.
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